The notion of plaintext awareness (PA) has many applications in public key cryptography: it offers unique, stand-alone security guarantees for public key encryption schemes, has been used as a sufficient condition for proving indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA), and can be used to construct privacypreserving protocols such as deniable authentication. Unlike many other security notions, plaintext awareness is very fragile when it comes to differences between the random oracle and standard models; for example, many implications involving PA in the random oracle model are not valid in the standard model and vice versa. Similarly, strategies for proving PA of schemes in one model cannot be adapted to the other model. Existing research addresses PA in detail only in the This research work is part of the bilateral research project between Germany and Australia, funded jointly by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) public key setting. This paper gives the first formal exploration of plaintext awareness in the identity-based setting and, as initial work, proceeds in the random oracle model. The focus is laid mainly on identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms (IB-KEMs), for which the paper presents the first definitions of plaintext awareness, highlights the role of PA in proof strategies of IND-CCA security, and explores relationships between PA and other security properties. On the practical side, our work offers the first, highly efficient, general approach for building IB-KEMs that are simultaneously plaintext-aware and IND-CCA-secure. Our construction is inspired by the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform, but demands weaker and more natural properties of its building blocks. This result comes from a new look at the notion of γ -uniformity that was inherent in the original FO transform. We show that for IB-KEMs (and PK-KEMs), this assumption can be replaced with a weaker computational notion, which is in fact implied by one-wayness. Finally, we give the first concrete IB-KEM scheme that is PA and IND-CCAsecure by applying our construction to a popular IB-KEM and optimizing it for better performance.
Introduction
A modern approach to hybrid encryption is given by the KEM/DEM paradigm [1, 17, 18, 21, 39] , which gives a modular construction of public key encryption (PKE) and identitybased encryption (IBE) schemes. The key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is first applied by the sender to compute the key and its encapsulation. The output key is used in the data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) to encrypt the message. The recipient decapsulates the key and then decrypts the message. This mechanism is especially valuable for secure transmission of longer messages since the DEM part is usually based on fast, symmetric techniques.
Adaptive CCA security and transformations The widely accepted security notion for KEMs is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA 1 ) [18, 29] , and diverse KEM constructions satisfying this property have been proposed in the public key (PK-KEM) [13, [17] [18] [19] 32, 39] and the identity-based (IB-KEM) [6, 33] settings. Some [6, 19, 39] are secure in the random oracle model; others [13, 17, 18, 32, 33, 39] in the standard model.
In general, IND-CCA-secure KEMs can trivially be obtained from any IND-CCA-secure encryption scheme by encrypting (sufficiently many) randomly chosen messages that are then used as the encapsulated key. In the random oracle model, Dent [19] demonstrated that IND-CCA-secure PK-KEMs can further be obtained from PKE schemes that satisfy only a weaker property of one-wayness (OW). These results were extended by Bentahar et al. [6] to the identitybased setting. This parallels prior work on IND-CCA-secure encryption: in the random oracle model, transformations by Fujisaki and Okamoto [26, 27] and by Okamoto and Pointcheval [36] offer IND-CCA security for PKE schemes that are one-way and whose ciphertexts are close to uniformly distributed (so-called γ -uniformity); similar transformations were shown by Kitagawa et al. [34] and Yang et al. [42] to apply in the identity-based setting. In the standard model, IND-CCA-secure PK-KEMs can be obtained using transformations originally proposed for IND-CCA-secure PKE schemes, e.g., by adding a "proof of well-formedness" to an IND-CPA-secure scheme [17, 18, 23, 25, 37] , or by converting a weakly secure IBE scheme [10, 12, 14] .
Plaintext awareness and its role
The notion of plaintext awareness (PA) was introduced in the context of PKE by Bellare et al. [3] , Bellare and Palacio [4] and Bellare and Rogaway [5] , both in the random oracle model [3, 5] and the standard model [4] , with two variants (weaker PA1 and stronger PA2) in the standard model. 2 Roughly speaking, plaintext awareness demands that no ciphertext can be created without explicit knowledge of the encrypted message. From a technical perspective, this is represented by the existence of a plaintext extractor that, when run on the same inputs as the ciphertext creator, can produce the plaintext behind the ciphertext. Originally [5] , PA was seen as a strategy for proving IND-CCA security of PKE schemes (by using plaintext awareness to answer decryption queries). It is also useful in other contexts: for example, deniable authentication and key exchange protocols [22] can be built from plaintext-aware KEMs.
Bellare et al. [3] showed that, for PKE schemes in the random oracle model, combining PA and IND-CPA implies IND-CCA (but PA is not implied by IND-CCA in general). In the standard model, Teranishi and Ogata [40] proved that IND-CCA security of PKE schemes is implied by onewayness (OW) and PA2, and also that, surprisingly, in the random oracle model, this implication fails. This serves as a hint that not all standard model results on plaintext awareness carry over to the random oracle-based setting and vice versa.
Birkett and Dent [7, 8] observed that, while PA was a useful strategy for proving IND-CCA security in the random oracle model, it was not always useful in the standard model, where some PA2 proofs often assumed that the PKE schemes were already IND-CCA-secure. They also developed a different proof strategy for PA2 security of PKE schemes (in the KEM/DEM paradigm) by considering a weaker notion of plaintext awareness combined with a new property, "simulatability," and used this to prove that Cramer-Shoup PK-KEM [18] is PA and IND-CCA-secure (see also Dent's earlier proof [20] ). Teranishi and Ogata [41] proved PA2 for Cramer-Shoup PKE using a slightly weaker (but similar) property instead of simulatability.
With respect to plaintext awareness of hybrid PK-KEM/ DEM constructions, Jiang and Wang [31] proved that a PK-KEM that simultaneously satisfies a variant of IND-CCA security and some weaker notion of plaintext awareness combined with a one-time unforgeable DEM results in a hybrid construction that offers PA2 (for both the random oracle and standard models).
Our focus Existing work on plaintext awareness and its relevance for proving IND-CCA security has been carried out for PKE and PK-KEMs. Current knowledge on plaintext awareness in the identity-based setting is very limited. To date, no definitions of plaintext awareness for IB-KEMs exist, neither in the random oracle nor in standard models. Are the techniques developed for relating plaintext awareness and IND-CCA security of public key schemes applicable to the identity-based setting? Can existing transformations be applied to construct identity-based schemes that are both plaintext-aware and IND-CCA-secure?
In fact, the standard model proof strategies [7, 8, 41] for plaintext awareness of PK-KEMs, demonstrated successfully and dashed lines indicate that one property can be obtained either by applying a transformation (e.g., F transforms an OW scheme into an OW-CCA scheme) or by satisfying two properties (e.g., a scheme that is both OW and PA is also OW-CCA) on the Cramer-Shoup scheme [18] , do not seem to apply to current standard model IB-KEMs. For example, the prominent IND-CCA-secure standard model IB-KEM by Kiltz and Galindo [33] , which can be seen as a pairing-based variant of the Cramer-Shoup PK-KEM, does not have the simulatability property required by Birkett and Dent [8] (nor the relaxation used by Teranishi and Ogata [41] ). The lack of simulatability is due to the fact that ciphertexts output by the IB-KEM scheme from [33] admit publicly executable checks of their "well-formedness." It is therefore not possible to pick different ciphertext components uniformly at random and independently of each other; this stands in contrast to the simulatable ciphertexts of the PK-KEM from [18] whose "well-formedness" can only be checked using parts of the private key.
The above observations motivate a separate treatment of plaintext awareness in the identity-based setting, including its connection to IND-CCA security and the construction of generic transformations.
Our results and techniques
Our results In this work, we initiate the study of plaintext awareness for IB-KEMs, aiming to draw parallels and indicate differences to the corresponding results for PK-KEMs. While it is important to investigate plaintext awareness for IB-KEMs both with and without random oracles, here we work in the random oracle model (which tends to result in very efficient, practical constructions) and postpone standard model research to future work. We introduce definitions of plaintext awareness for IB-KEMs, investigate its role and relationship with other IB-KEM security notions (in particular, one-wayness and indistinguishability), and develop a method for obtaining highly efficient IB-KEMs that are simultaneously plaintext-aware and IND-CCA-secure from ones that satisfy only the basic notion of one-wayness.
Our results, which are summarized in Fig. 1 , are as follows:
-We provide (in Sect. 2) a formalization of plaintext awareness for IB-KEMs in the random oracle model and explore the relationship of this notion to other security notions, in particular observing that a scheme that is both PA and OW is also OW-CCA (Sect. 3). -We introduce in Sect. 5 a generic transformation F on IBKEMs, somewhat related to the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation [27] for PKE, that transforms an OWsecure IB-KEM into one that is both OW-CCA-secure and plaintext-aware. This construction is quite efficient. Our construction has an advantage from the perspective of provable security: whereas the proof of plaintext awareness of FO requires that the KEM be both OW and uniform, our construction F eliminates the needs for uniformity. Instead, our proof relies on a new intermediate security notion, computational uniformity, introduced in Sect. 4, which we show is actually implied by OW; hence, OW suffices for proving that our new construction yields PA. -As a consequence of our F construction, we observe a difference between OW, IND, and PA notions in the standard model versus the random oracle model. Teranishi and Ogata [40] showed that, in the standard model, OW and PA of PKE schemes implies IND-CCA security. For IB-KEMs in the random oracle model, we show that this does not hold. -In Sect. 6, we describe a simple hash-based construction # that adds IND security to our F transform (and preserves its plaintext awareness). -Together, the F and # constructions efficiently transform an OW-secure IB-KEM into one that provides plaintext awareness and IND-CCA security. As described in Sect. 7, some additional optimizations can be applied when these two techniques are used together. We show an application of this technique to the IB-KEMs that underlie the IBE schemes by Boneh and Franklin [11] and Sakai and Kasahara [38] , to construct highly efficient IB-KEMs that are simultaneously PA and IND-CCA-secure.
Since IND-CCA security does not in general imply plaintext awareness (either in the PKE setting [3] or for IB-KEMs, as we prove), our # • F constructions offer the only known provable approach for constructing IB-KEMs that are simultaneously PA and IND-CCA-secure.
Finally, we show that (adaptions of) our transformations for OW-secure IB-KEMs can also be applied to OW-secure PK-KEMs. This extends work of Dent [19] since PK-KEMs obtained with our transformations are both plaintext-aware and IND-CCA-secure. More importantly, PK-KEMs with PA and IND-CCA security readily admit construction of plaintext-aware hybrid PKE schemes based on the results from [31] for the KEM/DEM approach.
New techniques Central to our results is a novel perspective on the notion of γ -uniformity, which was originally defined in the public key setting [27] and has been extended to IBE schemes [41] . Existing random oracle-based transformations from OW to IND-CCA [26, 27, 36, 41] explicitly required γ -uniformity for the underlying encryption scheme. We show this requirement is unnecessary for plaintext awareness (and IND-CCA security) of KEMs.
Our proof technique uses a new, intermediate notion called computational uniformity. We prove that, for IB-KEMs, computational uniformity is immediately implied by onewayness. The understanding of this implication helps to explain why generic constructions of IND-CCA-secure IBKEMs in [6] do not require uniformity as a separate condition on the underlying OW-secure IBE encryption scheme: in [6] , an IBE scheme is used to encrypt random messages (from which encapsulation keys are derived) and can thus be seen as an OW-secure IB-KEM. Our technique also applies to the public key setting: In "Appendix A" we extend our results toward PK-KEMs showing that their computational uniformity is also implied by OW security. This paves the way for using our transformations developed for IB-KEMs in the construction of plaintext-aware and IND-CCA-secure PK-KEMs.
Notation
Unless explicitly stated, all algorithms and adversaries throughout this paper are probabilistic and polynomial time. Let A(x; r ) denote the running of A on input x and random coins r . We use the notation y $ ← A(x) to denote setting y to the output of A run on input x with uniform randomness, and y ∈ A(x) denotes that y is an element of the set of outputs of A when run on x with any randomness. If algorithm A outputs tuples, i.e., (x, y, z) ← A, then partial computation of the output vector is denoted with wildcards, e.g., (·, y, ·) ← A, if the first and third component of the result, x and z, are neither computed nor assigned.
Secrecy notions and plaintext awareness of IB-KEMs
The modular concept of hybrid encryption, where asymmetric encryption schemes are constructed from two building blocks-a KEM and a DEM-was originated by Cramer and Shoup [18] and is a popular design strategy for modern cryptosystems [19, 33, 35] . Specifically, in this paper we are interested in the identity-based variant of KEMs, although most of our results readily extend to the public key setting as well (cf. "Appendix A").
Definition 1 (IB-KEM) An identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM)
is a tuple Π = (Setup, Extract, Encap, Decap) of algorithms with, for each k ∈ N, associated finite sets IDSp(k), CoinSp(k), CipherSp(k), and KeySp(k), where -Setup(1 k ) is a master key generation algorithm which outputs a pair of strings (mpk, msk). -Extract(msk, id) is a key extraction algorithm which, on input master secret key msk and an identity id ∈ IDSp(k), outputs a string sk. -Encap mpk (id; r ) is a key encapsulation algorithm; it takes a master public key mpk, the recipient's identity id ∈ IDSp(k), and random coins r ∈ CoinSp(k), and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ CipherSp(k) and a key K ∈ KeySp(k). We use the notation Encap mpk (id)
as shortcut for Encap mpk (id; r ) with freshly drawn r $ ← CoinSp(k).
-Decap sk (c) is a key decapsulation algorithm which takes secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ CipherSp(k), and returns a key K ∈ KeySp(k) or the symbol ⊥. In the random oracle model, the four algorithms of an IB-KEM have access to a common set of random oracles 
Definition 2 (One-way security (OW[-CCA])) An IB-KEM
Π is said to be OW-(resp. OW-CCA-) secure if, for all adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ), the corresponding success probability is negligible in k, where we define A 2 ) , the corresponding advantage is negligible in k, where we define
Lemmas 1 and 2 follow immediately from the definitions:
Plaintext awareness
The notion of plaintext awareness, as established in the setting of PKE in [3, 4] , captures the intuition that no one can generate a (valid) ciphertext c * without knowing the message to which it will decrypt. This is a very strong notion of security, generally implying IND-CCA security of PKE schemes [3, 4] . In this section, we define an analogous notion for KEMs, in the identity-based setting. In particular, we demand that, given a plaintext-aware IB-KEM, it is impossible to come up with a ciphertext c * without knowing the key to which it will decapsulate. 3 In line with the PKE setting, we define plaintext awareness using two algorithms, the ciphertext creator A and the plaintext extractor K. The ciphertext creator's task is to output a target identity id * and a ciphertext c * . The candidate scheme is understood to be plaintext-aware if any such algorithm A could additionally output the key encapsulated in c * . This is formalized via the plaintext extractor K, which receives as input the transcript of all of A's interactions, including A's input, all oracle queries posed by A together with corresponding answers, and the values output by A. That is, K is in the position to retrace the computations that A performed to generate c * (see also Remark 4), and we expect from K to use this knowledge to output the key encapsulated in c * .
These ideas are formalized in Definition 4. As in [3] , we explicitly regard plaintext awareness in the random oracle model. In particular, although usually unnecessary outside the secret key setting, we provide an encapsulation oracle O E that allows creation of encapsulated keys, but without the adversary seeing random oracle queries asked from within corresponding Encap invocations. Availability of this oracle will become an important prerequisite for proving security against chosen-ciphertext attacks of plaintext-aware IBKEMs.
Definition 4 (Plaintext awareness (PA)) Let Π be an IB-KEM and A and K be algorithms (the "ciphertext creator" and "plaintext extractor," respectively). Consider experiment Expt PA Π,A,K from Fig. 3 and define the awareness of Π as
The following remarks discuss rationale and some interesting properties of Definition 4. Remark 1 (Oracle access of plaintext extractor) We emphasize a subtle difference between plaintext awareness of PKE according to [3] , and our Definition 4. In [3] , the plaintext extractor K is not given access to the random oracle H. This limitation is not motivated in [3] , but instead back in [5, Section 5] : "Note we don't give K oracle access to H: it is required to find the plaintext corresponding to [the ciphertext] given only A's view of the oracle". However, in the KEM setting, we disagree that this restriction is reasonable and argue 4 that K should be allowed to query the same random oracles that Decap is allowed to query, namely H (compare lines (e) and (f) of experiment Expt PA Π,A,K ).
Remark 2 (Success probability of plaintext extractor) For an IB-KEM to achieve plaintext awareness according to Definition 4, we demand plaintext extractor K to have overwhelming success probability. At first sight, this seems to be a very conservative requirement, but we argue that it is indispensable. Consider the case of a plaintext extractor K where Aw PA Π,A,K (k) is growing fast, but not overwhelmingly fast, for all A. We construct an adversary A * that picks a random identity id, runs polynomially many executions of
independently of each other in parallel, and applies K on each computed ciphertext c. If any such run of K fails to correctly extract the key (and it will, according to our assumption), corresponding c is the ciphertext c * output by A * (together with identity id). Clearly, when run on A * , we expect K to fail with high probability, in contradiction to assumed good performance of K. Following this intuition, it can be shown that K cannot be a λ(k)-extractor for any λ(k) > 0.
Remark 3 (Universality of plaintext extractor) Observe that plaintext extractor K, as defined in Definition 4, is a universal extractor: it does not depend on specific ciphertext creator A, but only on scheme Π . Although this is a very strong notion of plaintext awareness, in Sect. 5 we see that it can be achieved even by rather efficient IB-KEMs. When leaving the random oracle model, however, it seems that the concept of universal extractability is too strong. For instance, in [4] , the demand for a universal extractor is dropped. Instead, to achieve plaintext awareness, it suffices to have a specific plaintext extractor K A for each ciphertext creator A. Note that, in this paper, we exploit universality of plaintext extractors, e.g., in the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 4 (Random tape of ciphertext creator) We will shortly discuss a variant of Expt PA Π,A,K where K gets as additional input the tape R[A] of random coins used by A to craft (id * , c * ). While this modification would be meaningful from a modeling point of view, it is already noticed in [5] that the randomness used by A is usually not needed to prove schemes to be plaintext-aware, at least in the random oracle model. As this observation holds for the IB-KEMs analyzed in this paper, we decided to stay with (stronger) Definition 4. However, in standard model, K's knowledge of random tape R[A] is an unavoidable prerequisite for plaintext awareness, as pointed out in [4] .
Plaintext awareness and one-way security implies
OW-CCA security
Although being defined independently of each other, the different notions of secrecy and plaintext awareness considered in Sect. 2 are not unrelated to each other. In particular, we will establish a strong result in Theorem 1: IB-KEMs that are both OW-secure and plaintext-aware are also OW-CCA-secure, i.e., availability of a decapsulation oracle does not threaten OW security of plaintext-aware IB-KEMs. The intuition behind this implication is simple: given a plaintext-aware IB-KEM, an OW-CCA adversary A cannot gain advantage from its decapsulation oracle, as A "knows" the keys of all queried ciphertexts anyway. Nonetheless, the proof of Theorem 1 is technically involved as it has to cope with the fact that OW-CCA adversary A may query its O D oracle polynomially many times, while plaintext extractor K is applicable only to adversaries that output exactly one ciphertext.
Taken together, the following results separate the security notions PA and IND[-CCA], and illustrate once more the strength of the notion of plaintext awareness.
be any adversary against OW-CCA of Π . We construct an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) against OW of Π such that B 1 and B 2 run A 1 and A 2 , respectively, as subroutines. While all queries to O H and O X oracles posed by A will just be relayed by B to its own challenger, B will answer decapsulation queries to O D itself, by applying plaintext extractor K on (partially) simulated A. The precise specification of B 1 and B 2 is given in Fig. 4 (left part).
Let q D be the total number of decapsulation queries that A will ask. For 1 ≤ j ≤ q D , denote by (id j , c j ) the arguments of the j-th O D query, and let E j be the event that the query is correctly answered by B, i.e., that corresponding execution of K succeeds in computing the correct decapsulation K j of (id j , c j ). We will lowerbound the probability that E j occurs. Let
be a parameter set that plaintext extractor K would receive when run on C j , i.e., in experiment Expt PA Π,C j ,K , initialized with the same mpk and instantiation of H as B. Careful comparison of the specifications of B and C j reveals that τ j and τ j are equally distributed (more precisely, if B and C j are executed on the same random tape, then we have τ j = τ j ). If K j denotes the decapsulation of (id j , c j ), then also (τ j , K j ) and (τ j , K j ) obey the same distribution, and hence,
This concludes the proof, as 1 − q D (1 − λ(k)) is an overwhelming quantity. Right specification of PA adversaries C j whose transcripts match the parameters provided by B to the jth execution of K queries. Note that for arbitrary HLi, XLi, ELi lists we cannot expect K to correctly extract keys with any reasonable probability. Indeed, in order to argue that the parameters τ j provided by B are sufficient for extraction of the desired keys, we had to specify auxiliary PA adversaries (C j ) 1≤ j≤q D , and had to show that these would give raise to the same parameter sets when run in Expt PA Π,C j ,K . Interestingly enough, these adversaries C j were not designed to be ever executed: it is their bare existence that is necessary for the proof of Theorem 1 to go through.
The techniques used to prove Theorem 1, that OW ∧ PA ⇒ OW-CCA, cannot be applied to prove the IND analog that IND security and PA imply IND-CCA security. The reason for this is a subtle difference between the OW notion and the IND notion that, in the IND case, renders inapplicable the proving technique we discuss in Remark 5: In experiment Expt IND-CCA , the adversary obtains ciphertext c * and (possibly) corresponding key K * from the challenger, but this cannot be reflected in parameters HLi, XLi, ELi that are provided to plaintext extractor K. Hence, in a proof constructed like in Fig. 4 , we cannot argue about K's success probability to answer decapsulation queries of A 2 correctly. In experiment Expt OW-CCA , however, adversary just obtains a random ciphertext c * encapsulated for identity id * . This finds its perfect correspondence in C j calling the O E oracle on id * [cf. line (d) in Fig. 4, right part] . Basically, this also explains why we have to set ELi = (c * ) when processing A 2 's O D queries.
Observe that implication IND ∧ PA ⇒ IND-CCA has been proven in the PKE setting [3] . The difference is that, in the IND-CCA experiment of PKE, the adversary has partial knowledge about the message that is encrypted in c * : it is either m 0 or m 1 , so adversary can query these to its encryption oracle O E . Fig. 5 Constructing Π from Π . We assume that id 0 is a fixed identity in IDSp(k), and all queries to H oracle are relayed without modification Although IND-CCA security is considered the strongest confidentiality goal for IB-KEMs, the following lemma shows that this property is too weak to imply plaintext awareness by itself.
Proof Let Π be an IND-CCA-secure IB-KEM. Consider IB-KEM Π that arises when modifying Π 's Setup to include into master public key mpk an encapsulation to some fixed identity id 0 ∈ IDSp(k), as specified in Fig. 5 . We will show that Π is not plaintext-aware, but remains to be IND-CCAsecure.
Observe To see that Π is not plaintext-aware, we show that any corresponding plaintext extractor would break OW security of Π . Assume toward contradiction the existence of a λ(k)-extractor K Π for Π , where λ(k) is overwhelming. Define adversary B against OW of Π as follows:
, and outputs K . We use the technique discussed in Remark 5 to justify that K Π will succeed with high probability in revealing correct key K : consider the simple ciphertext creator A for IB-KEM Π that, on input mpk , parses (mpk, c * ) ← mpk and outputs (id 0 , c * ). As A does not ask any queries to its oracles, i.e., HList = XList = EList = ∅, execution of K H Π (id 0 , c * , mpk , ∅, ∅, ∅) will readily extract the key encapsulated in c * for identity id 0 . More precisely, we have shown that Proof Consider the (correct, but insecure) IB-KEM in which Encap mpk (id; r ) returns (c, K ) = (r, r ), i.e., keys are equal to their encapsulation. The scheme is clearly not OWsecure. However, it is plaintext aware: an appropriate plaintext extractor K would just output the ciphertext.
Computational uniformity of IB-KEMs and its relation to one-wayness
We introduce two new security notions for IB-KEMs. The first one, uniformity (U), is defined mainly for historical reasons: it is the analog to the uniformity notion for PKE coined in [27] . We will see that its (strictly weaker) variant, computational uniformity (cU), is a very natural notion of IB-KEMs, already being implied by the basic secrecy requirement of one-way security (OW, Definition 2). In Sect. 5, it will find its application in the analysis of our generic transformation that achieves plaintext awareness for any IB-KEM. We give a treatment of the corresponding notions for PK-KEMs in "Appendix A".
Definition 5 (Uniformity (U)) Let Π be an IB-KEM with associated spaces IDSp, CoinSp, CipherSp, and
We say that Π is γ -uniform for a function γ :
A weaker notion of uniformity is that of computational uniformity, where the adversary's aim is to explicitly spot pairs (id, c) with
. This is formalized in Definition 6. Fig. 6 is not necessarily efficient, but the experiment is still well-defined.
We now analyze the relation between uniformity and computational uniformity. While Lemma 5 follows directly from the definitions, the proof of Lemma 6 is a bit more involved.
Then not all computationally γ -uniform IB-KEMs are γ -uniform, assuming the existence of a one-way function
Proof Let Π be a γ -uniform IB-KEM and let ow : IDSp(k) → {0, 1} k be a one-way function. Using Π and ow, construct IB-KEM Π * according to Fig. 7 . The new scheme is mostly identical to Π , but for a very small set of identities the encapsulation algorithm is artificially made deterministic. We will show that Π * is computationally γ -uniform, but not γ -uniform.
Consider identity id * that is randomly picked in Setup * and observe that encapsulation for id * is deterministic (line (b) of Encap * ). More precisely, we have Encap *
However, Π * is computationally γ -uniform: Note that for all identities id ∈ IDSp(k) with ow(id) = h * = ow(id * )
Hence, a successful adversary against cU would have to provide id ∈ IDSp(k) such that ow(id) = h * , i.e., break one-wayness of ow. This is infeasible by assumption.
Surprisingly, computational uniformity is implied by OW security and can thus be assumed for any reasonable IB-KEM. To prove this statement, we introduce a new intermediate security notion, (computational) collision uniformity (cCU), and show in Lemmas 7 and 8 that OW implies cCU and that cCU implies cU.
We start by establishing the notion of collision uniformity. We only regard the computational variant, as its informationtheoretic analog is not needed in this paper. Intuitively, an IB-KEM Π is collision-uniform if collisions of ciphertexts occur rarely, i.e., if (c 1 , K 1 ) ← Encap mpk (id; r 1 ) and (c 2 , K 2 ) ← Encap mpk (id; r 2 ) are run with independently drawn random coins r 1 , r 2 ∈ CoinSp(k), then c 1 = c 2 happens only with negligible probability.
Definition 7 (Computational collision uniformity (cCU))
Let Π be an IB-KEM with associated spaces IDSp, CoinSp, CipherSp, and KeySp. Fig. 8 is not necessarily efficient, but the experiment is still well-defined.
The following lemma shows that computational collision uniformity is stronger than plain computational uniformity:
Now, if adversary A against computational γ -uniformity manages to output a pair (id, c) such
holds as well. In other words, an adversary B against computational Γ -collision-uniformity is given by a modified adversary A that outputs only id but not c. Observe that B has at least the same success probability as A.
Remark 7 (Colliding ciphertexts imply matching keys) In the proof of Lemma 7, equality "Encap H mpk (id; r 1 ) = (c, ·) = Encap H mpk (id; r 2 )" expresses that the ciphertexts output by Encap shall collide, but a requirement on the corresponding keys K is not explicitly given. Observe that it follows from correctness of IB-KEM that in case of colliding ciphertexts also keys K will match.
Remark 8 (Equivalent variants of Definitions 6 and 7) When coining the notion of computational uniformity in Definition 6, we allowed adversary A to query its O X oracle on any identity, including on the identity id output by A. In the next paragraph, we justify that this definition is equivalent to one where A is forbidden to query O X on id (but continues to be allowed to query O X on all other identities in IDSp(k)). The same observation applies to the notion of computational collision-uniformity in Definition 7.
Let A be a cU adversary in accordance with Definition 6. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A queries id to its O X oracle. Let q X denote the total number of (distinct) O X queries that A poses. We construct cU adversary A from A as follows: In a first step, A picks a number 1 ≤ t ≤ q X at random, basically guessing the number of the O X query which A will pose to ask O X (id). Then A simulates A until reaching the t-th O X query, relaying the first t − 1 queries to its own O X oracle. Let id t be the identity revealed in the t-th query. Adversary A outputs id t and stops. The tightness factor appearing in the analysis of this reduction is q X . Nevertheless, this shows that the notions are asymptotically equivalent.
We prove next that one-wayness implies collision uniformity. Intuitively, if cCU security of an IB-KEM Π is not given, then an OW adversary A could simply run (c , K ) $ ← Encap mpk (id * ) and would hit the challenge ciphertext with non-negligible probability, i.e., c = c * . As matching ciphertexts imply matching keys (cf. Remark 7), A can break OW security by just outputting K . We formalize this idea as follows:
Proof Assume that Π is not computationally collisionuniform, i.e., there exists a non-negligible Γ and a successful adversary B against Γ -collision-uniformity. Given B, we construct an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against OW of Π , as shown in Fig. 9 . Observe that A 1 is well-defined due to Remark 8.
Consider line (c) of the specification of adversary A 2 and denote by E the event that c = c * . Remark 7 shows that occurrence of E implies K = K * , i.e., correct decapsulation of c * by A 2 . Careful comparison of Definition 7 with line (d) of Expt OW (Fig. 2) and line (b) of A 2 reveals that the 
Taken together, Lemmas 7 and 8 establish the following corollary:
For completeness, we show that the notions OW and cU are not equivalent, i.e., that OW is strictly stronger than cU.
Lemma 9 (cU ⇒ OW) Not all computationally uniform IB-KEMs are OW-secure.
Proof Consider the (correct, but insecure) IB-KEM in which Encap mpk (id; r ) returns (c, K ) = (r, r ), i.e., keys are equal to their encapsulation. The scheme is clearly not OWsecure. However, it is computationally uniform, provided that CoinSp(k) is super-polynomially large.
Obtaining plaintext awareness for IB-KEMs
After seeing in Sects. 1 and 3 that plaintext awareness is a valuable property of (IB-)KEMs, the question arises on how this property can be achieved. For this purpose, we introduce a generic transformation F that (a) converts a computationally uniform IB-KEM into a plaintext-aware scheme, and (b) strengthens its security from OW to OW-CCA. Our transformation F is inspired by the FO approach [27] for PKE schemes, but with some differences in structure and properties. Unlike [27] , our transformation does not achieve the highest level of security, IND-CCA, directly, but when combined with the hash transformation # in Sect. 6, we obtain IND-CCA security and plaintext awareness simultaneously.
It is easy to verify that, if Π is a correct IB-KEM, then so is F(Π ).
Observe that Definition 8 views KeySp as a group. This is quite common in practice, as fixed-length bit strings with the XOR operation form a group. Alternatively, as detailed in Sect. 7.1, one can simply hash the key to a fixed-length bit string. We will see in Sect. 7.1 that even if KeySp is already a group, hashing to a bit string may provide a performance optimization which is attractive for the design of practical schemes.
Compared with the original FO [27] , our transformation F has many similarities, but a few differences as well. Considering that KEMs are not fully fledged encryption schemes and thus need not process arbitrary-length messages but rather keys from a finite key set, our construction eschews symmetric encryption (which is used for messages in hybrid encryption schemes) for a simple one-time pad of the key K , with randomness r taking the role of the pad. The latter is necessary for verifying the decapsulation. These changes lead to a proof of security for F, as we will see, under weaker and more natural assumptions as those used in [27] .
We can now move to our main technical result regarding the F transformation: it results in an IB-KEM that is plaintext-aware, assuming the original scheme was computationally uniform. The plaintext awareness comes from the query to the new random oracle H , i.e., the ciphertext will not decapsulate unless the intermediate value r was queried to H , in which case that same value r can be used to derive the key.
Theorem 2 (F : cU → PA) Let Π be an IB-KEM. If Π is computationally uniform, then F(Π ) is plaintext-aware.
Proof We use notation from Fig. 10 We see that there is a perfect match of the decapsulation capabilities of Decap * sk * and K in cases (1) and (2) . In case (3), K correctly simulates the behavior of Decap * sk * with overwhelming probability. This shows that F(Π ) is plaintext-aware.
Having shown that F introduces plaintext awareness, we now examine its secrecy properties, aiming to prove that F transforms any OW-secure IB-KEM into an OW-CCAsecure scheme. First we will show that F preserves OW security.
Lemma 10 (F
Proof The proof in general proceeds as a sequence of games in which related values are gradually decoupled. Although the concept is straightforward, the proof requires some care.
We define a sequence of games. Game G 1 will be the original OW experiment Expt OW
F (Π),A (k) for F(Π ).
In subsequent games, we will modify how the challenger generates the challenge ciphertext to allow it to, at various stages, insert a challenge from an OW challenger for Π . This will allow Fig. 2 . Changes between games are shaded. H is a random function and P is a random permutation us to show that an adversary that can break OW of F(Π ) can be used to break OW of Π . In Fig. 11 , we specify precisely how the challenge ciphertext is generated in each game. This corresponds to line (d) in the original Expt OW F (Π),A (k) experiment defined in Fig. 2 . For each game G i , we define S i to be the probability that game G i returns win; our goal is to bound S 1 . The first several games are simple rewriting steps.
Game G 2 . We replace random oracle H : IDSp(k) × KeySp(k) → CoinSp(k) with the composition of a random function H : IDSp(k) × KeySp(k) → CoinSp(k) and a random permutation P : KeySp(k) → KeySp(k), and give A oracle access to H • P which on queries of the form (id, r ) ∈ IDSp(k) × KeySp(k) returns H (id, P(r )). Since H • P has the same distribution as H, S 1 = S 2 .
Game G 3 . We rewrite the generation of the input to the hash function in terms of a separate variable r . This is a bridging step, so S 2 = S 3 .
Game G 4 . We simplify the generation of the variable r . Since P is a permutation, this does not change the distribution, and hence, S 3 = S 4 .
Game G 5 . The hop from game G 4 to game G 5 contains the essential step of generating r 1 independently from r . This serves to decouple ciphertext components c 1 and c 2 . We will show that this change cannot be detected unless Π is not OW.
Let A be an algorithm that can distinguish G 4 from G 5 . To distinguish the two games, A needs to induce an (id * , r ) query to H . Since A only has access to H • P, and since P is a permutation, the only way A can induce such a query to H is if A queries (id * , P −1 (r )) to H • P. Observe that Decap sk (c 1 ) in both G 4 and G 5 . Hence,  given (c 1 , c 2 ) , distributed either as in G 4 a query (id, z) at random, constraint to id = id * . Returnĉ * 2 − z as the guess for the key that corresponds to the challenge ciphertextĉ * .
We have shown how to use a distinguisher A for G 4 and G 5 to construct an algorithm B for breaking the OW security of Π . Hence,
where q H denotes the total number of queries to H • P. This difference is negligible, assuming that Π is OW-secure.
Game G 6 . We replace c 2 with a random value. In G 5 , r is independent of c 1 so c 2 is independent of c 1 , and moreover r is uniformly random, so P −1 (r ) is uniform, and hence, c 2 is uniform. In G 6 , c 2 is clearly independent of c 1 and is clearly uniform. Thus, the distributions of (c 1 , c 2 ) in G 5 and G 6 are identical, so S 5 = S 6 .
Finally, we need to bound S 6 . Suppose A wins in game G 6 . We run A on the same environment as G 6 but this time we replace ciphertext component c 1 in G 6 with the challenge from an OW challenger for Π . This exactly matches the distribution in G 6 . Thus, A can be used to break OW security of Π , and thus, we have an algorithm B such that S 6 = Succ OW Π,B (k) which is negligible, assuming Π is OW-secure.
Combining the intermediate results demonstrates that
Remark 9 (Better tightness in proof of Lemma 10) In Lemma 10, we saw that the F construction preserves oneway-ness. The proof introduces a gap in tightness due to the random choice of z from the q H queries to H • P in the analysis of the hop from G 4 to G 5 . However, if Π is in fact IND-secure, then we can achieve a tight reduction: in the IND experiment, B 2 is given a potential key K and can check whether that K is equal to the one output by A 2 , or whether K is consistent with one of the queries to H • P. If one of these is the case, then B 2 answers that K is a real key, otherwise B 2 answers that K is a random value.
We can now combine the results of this section with some previous results to show that the F transformation results in an IB-KEM which is both plaintext-aware and OW-CCAsecure.
Corollary 2 (F
Proof Since Π is OW, then by Corollary 1 it is also computationally uniform. By Theorem 2, F converts a computationally uniform scheme into a PA scheme. By Lemma 10, F preserves OW. Thus, we have that F(Π ) is OW and PA, by Theorem 1 it is also OW-CCA.
Corollary 2 stands in contrast to the original FO transformation [27] , which required uniformity as a separate precondition in addition to OW; we have identified a (strictly) weaker precondition, computational uniformity, which follows from OW security.
Given an identity id, a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ) , and a potential corresponding key K , anyone can check if K does in fact correspond to c: computer ← c 2 − K ,r 1 ← H (id,r ), and check if (c 1 , K ) is equal to Encap * mpk (id;r 1 ). In other words, there is a public consistency check of ciphertexts and keys. As a result, F(Π ) can never be secure in the sense of an indistinguishability experiment such as IND or IND-CCA, which proves the following lemma:
This result leads to an important observation contrasting random oracle model results from standard model results. Teranishi and Ogata [40] showed that, for PKE in the standard model, OW∧PA2 ⇒ IND-CCA. Corollary 2 and Lemma 11 show that this is not the case for IB-KEMs in the random oracle model: assuming Π is OW, we have that F(Π ) is PA and OW, but F(Π ) is not IND.
Remark 10 (On the implication OW ∧ PA ⇒ IND-CCA from [40] ) We briefly discuss the intuition behind the surprising implication OW ∧ PA ⇒ IND[-CCA], discovered in [40] in the context of PKE and plaintext awareness defined in the standard model [4] . In the proof, assuming toward contradiction that the encryption scheme is not IND-secure, the authors construct a (stateful) plaintext creator P that encrypts a random message and transmits resulting ciphertext c to PA adversary A via a series of O E queries. This ciphertext is output by A, and obviously no plaintext extractor K can recover the encrypted message. Regarding a standard model definition of plaintext awareness for KEMs, we doubt that above implication would hold as well. The key argument is that there would be no plaintext creator P, which plays the central role in the attack scenario described above. and so # will play an important role in achieving this property. We admit that this technique has been used earlier for the same purpose [6, 19] ; however, we additionally prove that it preserves plaintext awareness. Fig. 12 , with random oracles H = H ∪ {H # } and associated spaces
It is easy to verify that, if Π is a correct IB-KEM, then so is #(Π ). The following Lemmas 12 and 13 show that # converts arbitrary OW-secure schemes into IND-secure schemes and preserves plaintext awareness. ' s output and returns a randomly chosen entry from HLi as its guess for the key corresponding to c * , where HLi denotes the list of all answers given to H # queries made by A # 1 and A # 2 . Let K * be the (real) key corresponding to c * . Let E be the event that K * is queried to the H # oracle by A # . We have Pr Expt Lemma 17) . If E occurs, then K * is contained in HLi and A 2 returns it with probability (at least) 1/q, where q = |HLi| is polynomially bounded. Hence,
Lemma 12 (#
This proves the lemma.
Lemma 13 (#
Proof Let K be a plaintext extractor for Π and let A # be a PA adversary (ciphertext creator) for #(Π ). Observe that, syntactically, it is possible to run K on transcripts from A # . Let (id * , c * , mpk, HList, XList, EList) be a transcript of A # and K be the key output by K on that input. Since K is a plaintext extractor for Π , we have that K = Decap H Extract(msk,id * ) (c * ) with high probability and hence
That is, the plaintext extractor K # = H # • K, obtained by combining K with H # , is a valid extractor for #(Π ). In particular, K # has the same success probability as K.
Observe that, in the above proof of Lemma 13, we did not exploit the fact that H # is a hash function (or even a random oracle). Indeed, the proof would have worked as well if the construction in Definition 9 had applied on the key any other kind of deterministic function (for example, the truncation of a fixed number of bits). However, the use of a random oracle in the # construction is an essential prerequisite of the proof of Lemma 12.
We are now ready to state the central result of this paper: by combining transformation # with transformation F, we can convert any OW-secure IB-KEM into an IB-KEM that is simultaneously plaintext-aware and IND-CCA-secure.
Theorem 3 (Main
Proof By Corollary 2, F(Π ) is PA and OW-CCA-secure. By Lemma 13, #(F(Π )) is PA and by Lemma 12 it is further IND-CCA-secure.
This overall generic construction is powerful yet extremely efficient: encapsulation has just two additional random oracle queries, and decapsulation requires two random oracle queries and a partial encapsulation. We do not require any additional randomness or public parameters. In Sect. 7.1 we show how to further optimize the overall transformation.
Plaintext-aware IB-KEMs in practice: applications and optimizations
We apply our generic transformations from Sects. 5 and 6 to two popular IB-KEMs, 5 namely to BF-IB-KEM by Boneh and Franklin [11] , and to SK-IB-KEM by Sakai and Kasahara [38] . Both schemes are defined in the pairing-based setting and proven (OW-)secure in the random oracle model. In order to obtain plaintext-aware IB-KEMs of maximum efficiency, we additionally develop a simple yet general and highly effective optimization of our transformation F from Definition 8.
We start by providing background on the cryptographic setting in which BF-IB-KEM and SK-IB-KEM are defined. Let G 1 = g 1 , G 2 = g 2 , and G T = g T be cyclic groups of prime order q. Let e :
Moreover, let ψ : G 2 → G 1 be an efficient homomorphism such that ψ(g 2 ) = g 1 . This setting, for which efficient instantiations are known [2, 9, 28] , is usually called a Type II setting [28] , and hardness of BDH and t-BDHI problems [16] are widely assumed:
-t-BDHI:
Improving efficiency of transformation F
Although the F transformation from Sect. 5 is already reasonably efficient, we identify a way to further optimize its performance in practice. For a motivation of our optimization consider the schemes BF-IB-KEM and SK-IB-KEM, as specified in Definitions 11 and 13, respectively. In both schemes we have KeySp(k) = G T . This set is a group, i.e., the corresponding requirement on KeySp(k) from Definition 8 is naturally fulfilled and F transformation can be directly applied to both IB-KEMs. However, sampling randomness r uniformly from G T , as needed in Encap * algorithm (cf. Fig. 10 ), is a relatively costly operation. Indeed, in practice it will require an additional exponentiation: pick random exponent h $ ← Z q and compute r via r ← g T h . We propose a general optimization to the F transformation which does not require sampling from KeySp(k), and potentially notably increases obtained scheme's performance.
To Technically speaking, the proposed transformation involves twice the application of the # transformation from Sect. 6 to the respective IB-KEM. Lemmas 12 and 2 show that its first application preserves OW security (it even yields an BF-IB-KEM is the underlying primitive to the BonehFranklin IBE scheme [11] . More precisely, the BasicIdent scheme from [11] is the canonical transformation of BF-IB-KEM into an IBE scheme, using a KEM/DEM construction where one-time pad encryption is used for the DEM part. BF-IB-KEM is OW-secure under Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption [16] .
Definition 11 (BF-IB-KEM)
The Boneh-Franklin identitybased key encapsulation mechanism is specified in Fig. 14 (left part), where
Correctness of BF-IB-KEM follows from equality
c).
Note that encapsulation requires one pairing evaluation and two exponentiations, while decapsulation takes a single pairing operation. By applying to BF-IB-KEM the transformation from Definition 10 we obtain BF-IB-KEM + : Fig. 14 
The security properties of BF-IB-KEM + are implied by Theorem 4: The second IB-KEM that we analyze in this section was proposed by Sakai and Kasahara in [38] . Its main advantage over BF-IB-KEM is its efficiency: encapsulation operations do not require any pairing evaluation. Moreover, there is no need to efficiently hash into G 1 or G 2 , but only into Z q .
Theorem 5 BF-IB-KEM

Definition 13 (SK-IB-KEM) The
Sakai-Kasahara identitybased key encapsulation mechanism is specified in Fig. 15 (left part), where
SK-IB-KEM is proven OW-secure in [15, 16] , assuming hardness of t-BDHI problem. Observe that secret keys cannot be extracted if H 1 (id) = −msk, but this occurs only with negligible probability. In all other cases correctness is established by
Encapsulation requires two exponentiations but no pairing operation. Efficiency of decapsulation is the same as in BF-IB-KEM, namely one pairing evaluation. We apply the transformation from Definition 10 to SK-IB-KEM and obtain SK-IB-KEM + :
Definition 14 (SK-IB-KEM + ) SK-IB-KEM + is specified in Fig. 15 
We let Theorem 4 establish the security properties of SK-IB-KEM + : 
Theorem 6 SK-IB-KEM
Conclusion
We have defined and analyzed the notion of plaintext awareness for KEMs in the identity-based setting and the public key setting in the random oracle model. We have explored the relationships between plaintext awareness and other security notions, noting that a scheme that is both PA and OW is also OW-CCA. We have also introduced a generic transformation F, somewhat related to the FO transformation for PKE, that can be used to construct a plaintext-aware KEM from an OW-secure KEM. Notably, our F construction uses a weaker security notion which we call computational uniformity (and which is in fact implied by OW) than the distinct notion of uniformity required by FO; this security notion may be of independent interest. We further propose a simple hash-based construction # that, combined with our F construction, converts a weak (OW-secure) KEM into a strong (plaintext-aware and IND-CCA-secure) KEM. We apply this construction to several existing IB-KEMs, resulting in the first provably plaintext-aware secure IB-KEMs. This transformation can also be applied in the public key KEM setting. Our techniques and results apply in the random oracle model. Existing proof strategies for plaintext awareness in the standard model, such as the simulatability approach of Birkett and Dent [8] , do not seem to apply current standard model IB-KEMs, and we identify the development of proof strategies for plaintext awareness of identity-based constructions in the standard model as open question.
Appendix A: Extending our results to PK-KEMs
We explore the applicability of our IB-KEM-related results from Sects. 3-7 to the setting of public key KEMs. A PK-KEM is generally given by a set of three algorithms: KeyGen, Encap, and Decap. We observe that IB-KEMrelated definitions of syntax, secrecy (OW[-CCA] and IND[-CCA]), computational uniformity (cU), and plaintext awareness (PA) can readily be adapted to the PK-KEM setting by replacing in the security experiments (mpk, msk)
, and by further leaving out identities and availability of O X oracles.
We prove in "Computational uniformity of PK-KEMs and its relation to one-wayness" in section that for these adapted definitions the implication OW ⇒ cU still holds (cf. Corollary 1 in Sect. 4). Under this premise, a close inspection of our lemmas and proofs from Sects. 3 and 5-7 shows that their statements remain valid in the PK-KEM world. In particular, we have correspondence for Theorem 1 (OW ∧ PA ⇒ OW-CCA), Corollary 2 (F : OW → PA ∧ OW-CCA) and Theorem 3 (# • F : OW → PA ∧ IND-CCA), with slightly adapted F and # transformations. We refrain here from giving corresponding proofs as it would suffice to marginally adjust those from named sections to fit the public key setting.
In "Appendix A2" section, we adapt the optimized # • F transformation from Sect. 7 to the PK-KEM setting, and, for concreteness, apply this transformation to ElGamal-KEM, in "Appendix A3" section.
A.1 Computational uniformity of PK-KEMs and its relation to one-wayness
We define the notion of computational uniformity (cU) for PK-KEMs and show that it is implied by one-way security. As we did for IB-KEMs in Sect. 4, we prove this implication via an intermediate notion (CU), i.e., we prove OW ⇒ CU and CU ⇒ cU separately. Observe that CU is an informationtheoretic notion, while the intermediate notion cCU in the identity-based setting was computational (cf. Definition 7). This difference comes from the fact that cCU is based on an adversary B that outputs an identity for which collisions among ciphertexts become noticeable. In the public key setting, however, this step becomes obsolete and we are only interested in collisions among ciphertexts generated for one specific (randomly generated) public key. As the notion of OW security is readily derived from Definition 2 by "stripping off" all parameters and oracles related to the identitybased setting, we start by defining the notion of collision uniformity (CU). 
A.2 Obtaining plaintext awareness for PK-KEMs
In Sects. 5 and 6, we developed techniques that convert any OW-secure IB-KEM into a plaintext-aware IND-CCAsecure one. This conversion was further optimized (in regards to efficiency) in Sect. 7. In the PK-KEM setting, we directly propose an optimized transformation that turns any OWsecure PK-KEM into one that offers plaintext awareness and IND-CCA security.
Definition 17 (Optimized transformation for PK-KEMs)
Let Π = (KeyGen, Encap, Decap) be a PK-KEM with random oracles H and associated spaces CoinSp, CipherSp, and KeySp. Let H : {0, 1} k → CoinSp, H , H # : KeySp → {0, 1} k be three hash functions (independent of H), modeled as random oracles in the security analysis. Then PK-KEM Π + = (KeyGen + , Encap + , Decap + )
is specified in Fig. 18 , with random oracles H = H ∪ {H, H , H # } and associated spaces CoinSp + = {0, 1} k , CipherSp + =CipherSp × {0, 1} k , and KeySp + ={0, 1} k .
As, in Fig. 18 , hash functions H and H # are evaluated solely on K (respectively, onK ), computing them via a single call to a double-length hash function H H # : KeySp(k) → {0, 1} k × {0, 1} k is possible and reduces the total number of required hash functions to just two. The security of the transformation is established as in Theorem 4: We apply the transformation from Definition 17 to ElGamal's PK-KEM [24] . The latter scheme is OW-secure under the CDH assumption.
Definition 18 (ElGamal-PK-KEM) Let G = g denote a cyclic group of prime order q. The ElGamal key encapsulation mechanism Π = (KeyGen, Encap, Decap) is specified in Fig. 19 (left part) . We have CoinSp(k) = Z q , CipherSp(k) = G, and KeySp(k) = G.
Our transformation turns ElGamal-PK-KEM into ElGamal-PK-KEM + :
Definition 19 (ElGamal-PK-KEM + ) Let G = g denote a cyclic group of prime order q. ElGamal-PK-KEM + is specified in Fig. 19 (right part) , where H : {0, 1} k → Fig. 20 Plaintext awareness experiment PA2 (standard model) for IBE. We require that C does not query O D on (id, c) pairs contained in CList. We further assume that XList and CList implicitly add the number of the corresponding query to the entries they hold. This is required to allow C * to recover the order in which the two lists are populated Decapsulation in ElGamal-PK-KEM + takes one more exponentiation than decapsulation in the original scheme, i.e., the overhead introduced by the transformation is small. The length of ciphertexts is increased by only k bits and all newly introduced hash functions H, H , H # are straightforward to instantiate.
Appendix B: An approach toward identity-based plaintext awareness in standard model
For completeness, we briefly discuss the feasibility of lifting the standard model definition of plaintext awareness of PKE to the identity-based setting. We will focus only on the strongest variant (PA2), studied extensively by Bellare and Palacio in [4] . In particular, it is proven in [4] that, for PKE, notions PA2 and IND-CPA together imply IND-CCA, in standard model.
Plaintext awareness in the standard model is defined through the interplay of four efficient algorithms: C, C * , P, and D. The roles of the ciphertext creator C and plaintext extractor C * remain as in Definition 4 (we drop the names A and K for consistency with [4] ); new are the plaintext creator P that provides C with fresh ciphertexts of (partially) unknown content, 7 and a distinguisher D. We formalize our variant of PA2 for an IBE scheme Π in Definition 20 and Considering first experiment Expt PA2−d , the ciphertext creator C is run on input a master public key and given access to extraction, decryption, and encryption oracles. As the experiment has access to msk, queries to O X and O D can be perfectly simulated. Observe that encryption oracle O E employs plaintext creator P to craft ciphertexts for which C does not know the randomness used in the encryption, and for which C has only partial control over the encrypted message (think of a distribution of messages being encoded in Q; for details see [4] ). Eventually, C outputs a string x which is converted by distinguisher D into the output of the experiment. Now, if IBE Π is plaintext-aware, then all queries to O D should be simulatable by C itself. This ability is explored in Expt PA2−x , where plaintext extractor C * aims at correctly answering decryption queries posed by C. To have a fair chance in fulfilling this task, C * gets the same inputs as C, including C's random coins R C and all answers of oracle queries. Intuitively, Π is plaintext-aware if C * succeeds in simulating O D without C noticing it, i.e., if Expt PA2−d and Expt PA2−x are indistinguishable. Definition 20 (PA2 for IBE) Let Π be an IBE scheme. Let C be a ciphertext creator, P be a plaintext creator, D be a distinguisher, and C * be a plaintext extractor. We define the PA2-advantage of (C, P, D, C * ) for Π as 
